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Abstract
Transnational  communities  have  flourished in the globalized era, creating a
Diaspora and sojourners that are  unlike  earlier waves of migrants. This paper
first  examines the main theories currently  used to describe  and explain
international migration and find them wanting. Through an examination of two
case studies of ethnic Japanese migrants (the Brazilian Nikkeijin and Peruvian
Nikkei) who return to their homeland after  living  abroad for one or two
generations,  the paper goes on to demonstrate that the concept of ‘international
migrant’ needs further theorizing to account for the impact of globalization and
globalism. To this end, the author calls for the development of new theoretical
understandings of the evolution of transnational community formation that
would be multi-variate and robust enough to guide future public policy and
research.
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Résumé:
A l’heure de la mondialisation, les communautés transnationales ont fleuri et
donné naissance à une diaspora et à des personnes de passage qui différent des
précédentes  vagues de migrants. En premier  lieu,  cet article examine les
principales theories selon lesquelles sont actuellement décrites et expliquées les
migrations internationales et considère les failles de ces dernières. A travers deux
études de cas de migrants japonais de deux ethnies (les Brésiliens Nikkeijin et
les Péruviens Nikkei) qui retournent  chez  eux  après  avoir  vécu à l’étranger
pendant une ou deux générations,  l’article démontre que le concept de « migrant
international »  demande  une théorisation plus  poussée  qui tienne compte de
l’impact de la mondialisation et du mondialisme. Pour aller dans ce sens, les
auteurs appellent au développement de nouveaux moyens théoriques qui
permettent de comprendre l’évolution de la formation des communautés
transnationales. Des moyens qui devraient être multidiversifiés et suffisamment
robustes pour guider la politique publique et la recherche à venir.
Mots clés: Migration internationale, mondialisation,  personnes de passage,
diaspora
Introduction
There has been a surge in analyses of international migration, diaspora politics,
and ethnic and transnational community formation over the past decade or so
within  academic  and policy circles, during what can be best  labeled as a
“transnational  moment.”  [Keohane & Nye, 1971] Journals such as Public
Culture, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Global Governance: A
Review of Multilateralism and International Organization,  Population and
Development  Review,  International Migration Review,  Demography, and the
revived Transitions are examples of some of the venues where this discourse is
currently  taking  place  among  academics.  Immigration and multi-cultural
ministries in most major industrial countries are having to address these issues,
and are especially concerned with illegal immigration (or queue-jumping) and
undocumented migration in light of the fact that the in-flow of people into these
countries is greater than the out-flow. [Edmonton Journal, May 27, 2001: p.B9
and United Nations, 1998]
The agendas of the United Nations, the European Union, the Commonwealth,
La Francophonie, and other international bodies, reflect a major interest in
transnational cultures, the politics of transnational and international migration,Conceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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and what James Clifford refers to as the “contact zones of nations, cultures and
regions”.
1 [Clifford: p.283] In addition, conflicts and internecine violence have
resulted in forced  migration and the phenomenon of internally displaced
persons. [Appadurai, 1999: 305-324] The situation is especially grave in Africa
where, by the end of 2000  there  were an estimated 3.6 million  refugees.
2
[UNHCR, 2001: 7]
This  paper  uses a multi-variate analysis to examine the phenomenon of
international migration in the hope of shedding some conceptual light on what
it has come to mean in the present globalized era. First,  the main theoretical
frameworks within which international migration has been analyzed in the past
are succinctly presented. Each “theory” is found wanting in the sense that every
one of them, in and of itself, cannot provide a necessary  and  sufficient
explanation to account for the multifarious elements of trans-border
mobilization. Secondly, two case studies are analyzed to see the extent to which
some of the theories used to explain international migration hold. They also
allow the reader to compare the pattern and variety of international migration
among ethnic communities that are quite similar in terms of their history and
experience, viz., Brazilian  Nikkeijin and Peruvian Nikkei. Third, attention is
then switched to examining the diaspora as one variant of international
migration. A distinction is drawn between the traditional concept of diaspora
and a revised concept of diaspora (as sojourners) in the age of globalization and
globalism. The overall argument made in this  paper is that at this particular
juncture in our history, the patterns of international migration are changing. The
changes are of such that there is a need to move towards a more comprehensive
theorization of migration; one that critically and systematically analyzes and
dissects the various elements of transnational community formation (from the
more enduring to the transitory). The conclusion summarizes the findings and
draw out some of the main questions which researchers in the  future  need to
consider in developing a holistic theory of international migration.
However,  before  tackling the framework of analysis, it is important to
understand why there  has  been  such a verdant interest in the subject of
international migration.
Growing interest in the Study and
Politics of International Migration
Since the mid-1960s there has been a noticeable increase in the volume and level
of international migration and ethnic mobilization. The number of international
migrants went from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 1990. Indeed, close to
half of the population growth in developed  states was due to international
migration. Specifically, in Europe that figure was even higher at 90%. [United
Nations, 1998: 166] This growth has been accelerated with the advent of what
has been called the second wave of globalization.  [Helleiner,  2001:  243-264]
European  countries, during this period, attracted  significant numbers of
immigrant workers from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Middle East due inW. Andy Knight
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large part to the globalization of production. Canada and the United States also
experienced a major influx of new immigrants from those areas.  Even Japan,
which is stereotypically considered a xenophobic society began to import
migrant workers as well from poor countries in Asia and as far away as South
America to address domestic labour shortages amidst a declining birth rate and
aging population.
Most of the world’s developed  industrialized states have, as a result of this
international  migration, slowly become  multi-ethnic societies, much to the
chagrin of many within their populations. One  should note that prior to the
1960s international migration was not a major concern for most governments. In
fact only 13 per cent of Governments had expressed  policies with respect to
immigration.  But by the mid-1990s, that situation changed  dramatically. By
then, 40 countries had implemented specific immigration policies to deal with
what was perceived as a potential problem. [Ibid: 166] A cynic could argue that
international migration might not have received as much attention if the net in-
migration in developed countries did not threaten to upset the socio-economic
and political equilibrium that exists in these states.
It was at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in
1994 that the subject of international migration was thrust near the top of the
international agenda.
3 Countries faced with either an out-flow or in-flow of their
population  began to recognize that international migration was an important
aspect of social and economic development.
4 Some periphery countries became
concerned with the “brain drain”, while developed country leaders were anxious
to control the flow of immigrants coming into their states. The main concern for
the latter was with undocumented migrants and the drain which excessive
migration could have on their welfare systems. In addition, a number of scholars
noted that migration was perhaps  the most ubiquitous form of globalization.
[Held, et. al, 1999: 283-84]
The advent of a complex web of interconnectedness (aided in large  part by
international  telephone and cell-phone linkages, satellite television, fax
machines, computerization, the ‘information superhighway’ and improvements
to  transportation technologies) has been  the result of both globalization and
globalism
5 and often means that our lives are increasingly shaped by events that
occur, and decisions that are  made, at a great  distance  from us. [Mittelman,
1997] This fact has changed the very parameters of political life and calls into
question the categorical  distinctions that were  made in the past between, for
example, diaspora and other migrant communities. Globalization and globalism
processes have made it possible  for many international migrants to develop
multiple loyalties and identities. Communication and transportation advances
have made it easier for diasporic and other migrant communities to keep in
touch with others in the ancestral  homeland or in other countries where
individuals from those ethnic communities may be found. Electronic banking
has facilitated the process of migrant remittances (estimated at $75  billion
globally in 1994) from the ‘host’ country to the homeland. Transnationalization
of production and capital has allowed for stronger economic relations between
the international migrants and their country of origin.T
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In effect, the nature of contemporary international migration patterns is affected
by these changes. In many cases today, such migration can often be characterized
as short-term or temporary sojourns in a host country, in contrast to earlier
times when migrants left their homelands to settle abroad on a permanent basis.
[Kritz & Zlotnik, 1992: 1] Indeed, today people tend move back  and  forth
between ancestral and host countries with regularity.
But perhaps the most important factor responsible for increasing the global level
of consciousness about international migration issues was the noticeable change
in  the  geo-political-strategic  environment around  1989, with the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular,
scholars and policy makers began to focus on the rise in intra-state conflicts and
the concomitant increases in forced migration and displaced populations. Table
2 shows a marked increase in the number of refugees worldwide between 1985
and 1990. The total number of refugees  worldwide went from 8.2 million in
1981 to 10.5 million in 1985 and then to 14.9 million in 1990. It seemed to
have leveled off by 1995 with the total hovering around 14.5 million and there
was a slight decrease in early 1996 at 13.2 million.  The significant increases in
refugee flows was directly related to a number of natural disasters and major
civil conflicts, particularly in Africa, the Balkans and some parts of Asia.
6
Finally, particularly since the collapse of the bi-polar world, there has been an
increased focus among academics and policy makers on issues of ethnicity and
migration. John Rex notes that since 1989 the whole notion of “ethnicity” has
been in “ill-repute”.
7 [Rex, 1997: 269] Some observers have noted that since
that time, migrant ethnic minorities have been the focus of suspicion and
hostility in a number of countries.
8 [Abu-Laban, 1997] The increase in ethnic
immigration has led to a backlash in countries like Germany, Switzerland and
France.  Some citizens in those countries see  the influx of distant or ‘alien’
cultures as upsetting the equilibrium that has prevailed in their societies.
Regardless of the reason, the phenomenon of international migration in the
globalized era has become important for policymakers and academics  alike. It
has certainly raised a number of questions about the boundedness of states and
forced us to reconsider some of the theories that have been used to explain it.
Theoretical Explanations of International Migration
Several explanatory frameworks have been used to explain this surge in
international migration. Among them are: macro neo-classical economic theory;
micro neo-classical economic theory; new economics of migration theory; dual
labour market theory; world systems theory; and network theory. Yet, as noted
earlier  this  phenomenon  is  still  very  much  under-theorized.  Existing
explanations for international migration vary with the type of migration being
analyzed and whether the researcher is focusing on migrants as individuals or on
migration as a macro-level  phenomenon.  There is also a difference in the
explanation depending on whether one is focusing on the processes that generate
such migration or on those that sustain it.T
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Proponents of neo-classical economic theory who  analyze  the issue of
international migration from a macro level  perspective  argue  that  international
migration is largely the result of workers who are moving in search of higher
wages. In other words, the focus is on the international movement of
economically active individuals. Thus, international migration is spurred on,
according to this position, by differences in wage rates across countries.
International  migration of labour is largely demand-driven, according to this
position. We can  expect,  then,  increases in international migration when
governments or particular industries or companies create various incentives for
recruitment of workers from other countries, or when governments dismantle
barriers to the  free  circulation of labour. The problem with this position,
however, is that it tends to assume a homogeneity of skills between countries of
origin and countries of destination. This assumption would lead one to believe
that labour is more or less interchangeable  and that full employment is
maintained in both country of origin and country of destination during the
migration period.  Of course, those ideal conditions are seldom obtained in the
real world. Hence it should not come as a surprise that the macro model of
neoclassical theory is a poor (or insufficient) predictor of international migration
patterns and effects.
Neo-classical economists who analyze this issue from a micro perspective tend
to view international migration as stemming from international differentials in
both earning and employment rates. They start from the premise that countries
with a large  endowment of labour relative to capital tend to have a low
equilibrium market wage, whereas countries with a limited labour endowment
relative to capital tend to have  high  market wages. The wage difference,
according to this view, is the catalyst that entices  workers  from  low-wage
countries to move to high-wage ones. As the supply of labour decreases and
wages rise in the country of origin and the supply of labour increases and wages
fall in the country of destination, a new equilibrium is created in which  wage
differences reflect only the cost of migration. It is at that point that international
migration will slow down or stop altogether. [Sjaastad, 1962: 80-93; Harris &
Todaro, 1970: 126-42]
Indeed, these microeconomic-level neo-classical theorists explain that there is a
distinct pattern of migration amongst highly skilled workers  and non-skilled
workers. This could explain, in part, why individuals living in the same country
might display different  proclivities to migration. [Todaro, 1976] Regardless,
there are certain human capital characteristics that will likely increase the flow of
immigration into a “receiving” country, according to this position. The level of
an individual’s education, experience, training or language skill may determine
if that individual is allowed to enter the labour market of a receiving country.
Lack of employment or proper remuneration prospects may be the main factor in
an individual’s decision to migrate to a country where prospects are better. So
human capital factors play a role in the selectivity of international migration,
according to this position.
Also from the micro level, neo-classical  economists  argue  that levels of
migration  are  simply a matter of cost-benefit analyses/calculations made byConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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rational individuals. When applying this explanation to actual case studies, the
benefits of migration are measured  against the net returns (i.e. the difference
between expected earnings in the host country and expected  earnings in the
country of origin) at the individual level. Of course, it is not always possible to
decipher how precisely those “expected earnings” are derived. And, it has to be
taken into account that governments’ macro economic policies could assist in
inducing certain individuals to migrate. Correspondingly, such policies can also
be constructed to discourage migration or control the levels of immigration.
9
Basically,  according to this position, increases in the levels of international
migration occur when the cost of migration is lowered  and  decreases in such
migration is evident when the cost of migration is raised.
10  [Massey  et. al,
1994: 699-751] The main problem with the micro-model of neo-classical theory
is that it has not been tested rigorously in actual case  studies of international
migration.
The obvious limitations of both macro-  and micro-level neo-classical theories
sparked a paradigmatic shift towards alternative explanations of the international
migration phenomenon. The so-called ‘new economics of migration’ explanation
is focused at the micro-level. However, instead of making the assumption that
decisions about migration are  made  simply by rational individuals acting on
their own, this position holds that the decision to migrate (or not) is made by
families, households or specific  communities intent on maximizing expected
income and minimizing any risks to their economic  well-being. “From this
perspective, sending certain family members to work in another country where
wages and employment conditions are  largely independent of local economic
conditions is a form of insurance against the deterioration of the latter.” [United
Nations, 1998: 142] The remittances that are sent  back home to the families,
households or communities are then used to improve the economic lot of those
individuals who remain and to raise their standard of living.
The implication of the new economics of migration theory is that international
migration can indeed occur even when there are no obvious  wage differentials
between the country of origin and the country of destination. It also explains, in
part, the trend of ‘return  migration’, which is dealt with in the case  studies
below.  Migrants who have  done  well for themselves in the country of
destination, may decide to return home and use their gains to start up local
businesses in the country of origin, or to buy property, houses, livestock, cars,
etc., as status enhancers. The basic problem with this approach is that it does
not sufficiently account for the impact globalization, and globalism, has had on
international migration. Also, it does not fully explain why many educated
international migrants choose to work in low-status, low wage  jobs in the
country of destination.
The dual labour market theory tries to fill this gap by positing that international
migration results from a permanent  demand for foreign labour in developed
countries. [Piore, 1979] In these countries, because of the  prevalence of high
status, high paying position, finding local labour for  low-status, low paying
jobs might be difficult, particularly if those jobs do not offer prospect for up-
ward  mobility.  Increasing wages at the bottom of the occupational  hierarchyW. Andy Knight
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would cause pressure to increase wages at the upper level of that hierarchy. To
avoid this, governments and businesses may decide to import  foreign  workers
who  are  willing to work for the low wages  and to fill those low status
positions. These international migrants, usually from low-income countries, are
generally individuals who presumably care little about upward mobility within
the country of destination. Instead, they are  content to earn  the income from
these low wage jobs because that income may be several times greater than the
average wage in their home country. However, the dual labour market theory is
insufficient in explaining the “push” factors that  cause  individuals to want to
leave their home country for these low-status, low-wage jobs abroad.
Push and pull factors are better explained by world systems theorists who posit
that international migration is directly linked to the structure of a world market
that has been expanding exponentially since the sixteenth century. [Wallerstein,
1974] The capitalist expansion from Europe (the core) to areas in the periphery
(and formerly non-capitalists societies) has resulted in the creation of a mobile
population  (generally  from the South to the North). Thus international
migration,  according to this  historical-structural  model, merely  follows the
economic and political organization of a globally expanding capitalist market.
The penetration of this capitalist market  into the developing regions of the
world is thus seen as a catalyst that drives international migration as the
international flow of labour simply follows the international flow of goods and
capital. This is especially the case between colonial  powers and their former
colonies, since the links between  them  are a by-product of the capitalist
penetration of the periphery by the  core  countries. The problem with this
position is its over-reliance on structural explanations to the exclusion of agency
explanations. Also, it completely ignores the fact that there is now considerable
south-south migration.
It is widely acknowledged  today that international migration flows are not
sufficiently explained by rational actor decision-making models or by economic
factors that simply push migrants out of the sending country and pull them to
the receiving country. Castles & Miller, 1993: 21-22] Consideration has to be
given to other factors  that may provide alternate  explanations of this
phenomenon. For instance, economic theories of international migration are not
sufficient to explain the migration that takes place because of political and
religious persecution. Neither can structural theories fully explain the migration
that  occurs when individuals  decide to move to a better climate for health
reasons, or when they move simply for adventure, or when they move because
of  marriage or ethnic/family/community networks. Contrary to the position
taken by economistic proponents of rational choice, it is evident that
international migration is not always  voluntary or a matter of choice. [Lee,
1966: 45-47]  In other cases, international migration is facilitated by established
family/community/ethnic networks in both the country of origin and the country
of destination.
According to network theory, migrant networks “are  sets of interpersonal ties
that  connect  migrants,  former  migrants, and non-migrants in origin and
destination  areas  through ties of kinship, friendship and shared  communityConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
Migrants, Sojourners and Diasporas in a Globalized Era
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origin.” [Massey, et. al, 1997: 264] There is sufficient  evidence to show that
some migrants rely on family members who are  already  established in the
country of destination to obtain for them employment,  accommodation and
other forms of support during an initial period of adaptation in the country of
destination. The way in which such networks increase the level of international
migration is through the lowering of cost and risks of movement and the
increase in expected net returns of migration. In a sense, network connections are
a form of social capital upon which individuals draw in order to gain access to
foreign employment and opportunities. International migration is therefore seen,
according to this position, as a “self-sustaining diffusion process” which, once
started, tends to expand over time as international migration becomes
increasingly institutionalized through the said networks. [Bagchi, 2001: 9-31]
Governments on the receiving end of international migration may reinforce these
migrant networks through the development of immigration policies that give
members of these networks certain special rights (e.g. the reunification of
immigrants and their family members).
11
Migrant networks may also play a role in underground immigration markets.
Particularly when a receiving government has developed policies designed to
limit the flow of immigrants or to bar them from entry, migrant networks may
work to assist potential immigrants in gaining access to that country. This can
be done legally (e.g. arranged marriages between the migrant and a local from
the host country) or illegally (e.g. via counterfeit documents and work visas or
surreptitious  smuggling of migrants across borders). Some migrant networks
take on the role of humanitarian groups that provide counseling, legal and/or
services, shelter, and protection from law enforcement authorities. But migrant
network explanations are also limited by the very fact that they are conditional
on the whims and fancies of particular state/society complexes either in the
home country or the country of destination.
Indeed, all of the above explanatory frameworks have their limitations. They
cannot account for all cases of international migration. Neither can they always
explain  particular  types of, and specific  trends  in,  international  migration.
Perhaps by examining the different categories of international migrants we may
be able to arrive at a more holistic explanation for the phenomenon. In doing so,
we  will also be able to identify and understand some of the political/legal
factors (at both the national and international levels) that could limit,  facilitate
or force international migration.
Characterizing International Migrants
Table 3 provides a breakdown of the possible categories of international
migrants. There are essentially seven categories of international migrants. The
first constitutes individuals who have migrated to another country in order to
further their education and receive some form of specialized training usually not
obtainable in their home country. Foreign students are generally admitted to the
country of destination with a specific visa to follow a particular programme of  Migrants Admitted for Education and Training   Foreign Students
  Foreign Trainees
  Dependents of above
1.  Migrants Admitted for Employment   Seasonal Migrant Workers
  Project-tied Migrant Workers
  Contract Migrant Workers
  Temporary Migrant Workers
  Dependents of the above
2.  Migrants for Family Reunification   Immediate Relatives
  Marriage
    Migrants for Settlement   Employment-based
  Family-based
  Ancestry-based
  Treaty/Agreement-based
  Retirees who are not a burden 
       to the State of Destination
3.  Migrants Admitted for Humanitarian Reasons   Convention Refugees
  Resettled Refugees
  Displaced Persons
  Asylum Seekers
  Temporary Protection
4.  Diaspora   Traditional
  Non-Traditional
5.  Undocumented Migrants
Drawn from Box #1 - 
"Definitions of different categories of migrating foreigners," in Economic and Social Affairs,
World Population Monitoring 1997: International Migration and Development .  
New York:  United Nations, 1998, p. 7.
Table 3 
Possible Categories of International MigrantsConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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study for a specified period  (usually one year at a time).       Once that period is
over, the visa expires and a new one would have to be obtained. In some
countries, foreign students may be allowed to work. In which case, they would
be granted a work visa for a specified time indicating the conditions  under
which the work is allowed. Similarly,  foreign trainees can be admitted to a
foreign country in order to acquire on-the-job skills. A visa would be granted, in
such cases, for a specified period allowing those individuals to work within the
specific institution that provides this training. Immediate relatives (spouse or
dependent children) of foreign students or foreign trainees are usually allowed to
stay in the receiving country for the duration of time that the particular migrant
remains there.
The second category of international migrants is individuals who have  been
admitted to a foreign country for the explicit purpose of pursuing some
economic activity/labour, which receives remuneration from within the receiving
country. There are at least four sub-categories of these migrant workers: seasonal
migrant  workers; project-tied migrant workers; contract  migrant  workers; and
temporary migrant workers. As the term implies, seasonal migrant workers are
hired to perform work that depends on seasonal conditions (e.g. tobacco workers
and fruit pickers in Ontario, Canada). Many of these individuals work in quite
squalid conditions over a three to six-month  period and then return to their
homes, having accumulating much of the remuneration to be used to better
themselves and family back  home. Migrant workers  who  are admitted by a
receiving country to work on a specified project must leave the country once the
project has been completed. In most cases, the employer makes an arrangement
with the state to employ these project-tied  migrant  workers is therefore
responsible for ensuring that the migrants leaves the country once the project is
carried out. Related to the above are contract migrant workers. Instead of being
tied to a particular project, these migrants are issued a contract by the  foreign
country that sets limits on the period of employment and on the specific job
being held. During the employment period, the contract migrant worker is not
allowed to change jobs. Once the contract has been fulfilled, the migrant worker
is expected to leave the receiving country before another contract can be issued.
Temporary migrant workers may be admitted to a foreign country to work for a
limited time in a specific occupation. They are allowed to change employers and
have their work visa renewed without necessarily having to leave the country of
employment. In all of the above cases, dependents of foreign migrant workers
are allowed to accompany them.
The third category of international migrants constitute those foreigners who are
granted admittance to a receiving country because  they  are  either  engaged or
married to citizens of that country or to ‘landed’  immigrants (i.e. permanent
residents who are  not yet citizens). This category  may also include other
immediate family members who have applied to be reunited with an individual
citizen or landed immigrant of the receiving  country. The process of granting
admittance is not always  automatic as evidence of the relationship must be
verified and the family member in the receiving state must also demonstrate that
relative being brought into the country will not be a burden on the state.  W. Andy Knight
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The fourth category refers to migrants who are granted permission to stay in the
receiving country for a lengthy period or for an unspecified amount of time. In
such cases, these migrants for settlement may be employment-based, i.e.
selected for long term settlement because of particular qualifications or skills,
which the receiving country may require. Some of these migrants may be
candidates for long-term settlement because of family ties with citizens or
landed immigrants in the receiving country. Others may be admitted because of
their  ancestral  (historical/ethnic)  link and may be granted  citizenship in the
receiving country in very short order. Then there  are  those migrants with the
right to free establishment. By that is meant individuals who have the right to
enter, reside and work in a state other then their own due to an agreement or
treaty that has been concluded between the receiving and sending states. Finally,
under ‘migrants for settlement’ are foreigners who have  reached  retirement age
and who may be admitted to a receiving country under the condition that they
do not become a burden on the state. Generally these individuals are allowed to
be accompanied by their spouses.
The fifth category of international migrants is those foreigners who are admitted
to a receiving country for humanitarian reasons. Refugees, asylum seekers, and
individuals requiring temporary protection fall into this category. Refugees are
“persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political opinion, are
outside of their country of nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.” [United
Nations, 1998: 7] It is important to make the legal distinction between
Convention  refugees  – i.e. those refugees  who  are  granted  open-ended
permission to stay in the country of asylum and resettlement refugees –  i.e.
those refugees who  are  admitted to another country for resettlement. Asylum
seekers are individuals who file an application for  asylum in a country other
than their own and remain in the status of asylum seeker until their application
is considered by the country willing to receive them. Some countries are willing
to give open-ended  but  temporary protected status to individuals who are
outside their home country but who cannot return  because  their lives are in
danger.  Other individuals may be in refugee-like situations but do not legally
meet the United Nations 1951 Convention criteria of a refugee. In most  cases,
these individuals  are afforded the same protection as refugees  and may be
admitted to a receiving country for humanitarian reasons.
The sixth category of international migrants is characterized by the  term
diaspora. The term diaspora is generally used to describe any population that is
considered transnational or  ‘deterritorialized” (i.e.,  which has originated in a
country other than the one in which it currently resides and whose socio-
economic and political networks transcend state borders). Almost every minority
group these days tend to consider itself a diaspora without giving much thought
to the meaning of the word. This has resulted in an over-use and mis-use of the
term.
12  As Steven Vertovec  notes, the term diaspora has “become a loose
reference  conflating such categories as immigrants,  guest-workers,  ethnic and
‘racial’  minorities,  refugees, expatriates and  travelers”  and this has in effect
“threatened the term’s descriptive usefulness.” [Vertovec, 1997: 277]Conceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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However, I make the distinction between the traditional meaning of diaspora and
the more contemporary  and evolved concept. Initially the term diaspora was
used exclusively in reference to the traumatic experience of Jews who were
forced to leave their historical homeland, after  the destruction of the second
Temple in 70 AD, and were dispersed across the globe. [Encyclopaedia Judaica,
1971: 8-19; The Blackwell Companion to Jewish Culture, 1989: 167-69] The
connotation of the concept of diaspora was therefore a negative one linked to
displacement,  victimization,  alienation and loss. [Elazar,  1986:  212-257]
Another  important  feature of this social form is its longing to return to its
homeland. In the case of the Jews, it was not possible to return to their
‘homeland’ until the right political conditions were obtained.
13
That term ‘diaspora’ was appropriated and applied to any people who have, more
or less, been forced  out of their homeland as a result of being conquered or
persecuted. In other words, it has come to refer to the de-territorialization of a
people as a result of forced displacement, victimization, alienation and loss (e.g.
Greeks and Armenians). [Vertovec, 1997: 278-79]  Today, the concept has come
to embrace peoples of all nationalities and stripes who find themselves uprooted
for  both political and sometimes economic reasons. In essence, the
contemporary usage of the term is generally in reference to a particular social
form -- one that consists of an identifiable ethnic group that has been forced to
live in a country or state that is not its ancestral home but has nevertheless been
able to maintain some form of social bond despite being dispersed.
That social bond is usually the result of special historical and/or geographical
ties that keep  the diaspora together in either a national or transnational
community.  The construction of that community would most likely not be
possible without reference to some ethnic myth, a common historical
experience, a religious conviction or some tie to a specific geographic place. In
most  cases, the diaspora is able to develop networks of exchange and
communication that connect  the  ancestral  home with the new place of
settlement. The tie to the homeland is generally strong for a couple of related
reasons. First, there is usually a strong desire to return home when the political,
economic or social conditions are right. Second, because the diaspora tends to
hold on to its ethnicity or ‘difference’, it may be unwilling or unable to fit into
the host society.  Feelings of alienation and exclusion in the host country can
therefore feed the desire to go back to the country of origin.
Because of the strong ties to the ancestral home, diasporas are more often than
not involved as collective actors in bringing issues of the homeland to the
attention of the host country government. We are  all familiar with the strong
Jewish and Irish lobbies in the United States, for instance. In some cases, these
lobby groups are  transnational  because  the diaspora may be dispersed to a
number of countries. Globalization has facilitated the political actions of these
trans-state  groups.  Appadurai  notes,  for instance, the Sikhs  whose  diaspora
communities  can be found in many countries, including the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom. [Appadurai, 1990: 301-02]W. Andy Knight
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The final category refers to a residual category of international migrants who fall
outside of the domain of legal migration. Yet, the term “undocumented
migrant” is preferable to “illegal migrant” in this case because of the normative
connotation and generality of the latter term. [United Nations, 1998: 97] Due to
its  clandestine nature and the problems of procuring information on this
category of international migrants, it would be difficult to determine the actual
number of undocumented migrants. But the limited information that does exist
on this class of migrants indicates an exponential increase in its numbers. Most
of the developed states are  very  concerned  with  undocumented  migration as
public opinion in these states express resentment towards these individuals,
“who are believed to be compromising the native population’s economic and
social welfare...” [Ibid: 97] Clearly, undocumented migration has become even
more salient in the present globalized era. Governments have developed a
number of policies ranging from tacit facilitation
14  and amnesties to
deportations as a means of dealing with this so-called problem in international
migration.
The analysis of the above seven categories of international migration should
help researchers make conceptual distinctions between the variants of this trans-
border phenomenon. It is hoped that such conceptual distinction will lead to the
development of a more coherent and holistic theory of international migration.
The case studies below also play a role in this theory building. First, the case of
the Brazilian Nikkeijin will be examined for evidence of the nature and character
of this particular international ‘return migration’. Then the analysis will switch
to  the Peruvian Nikkei for evidence of the development of a transnational
community formation. Finally, the evolved  concept of contemporary diaspora
communities will be examined in order to understand the  character of the
politics of a specific  genre of international migrants during the current
globalized era.
The Case of the Brazilian Nikkeijin
The case of the Brazilian Nikkeijin  (individuals of Japanese origin who made
their homes in Brazil) is an example of the sojourner mentality, which can be
found among some international migrants. Japanese  settlers first arrived on
Brazilian shores around 1908. They were  mostly  Japanese farmers trying to
escape impoverished conditions in rural Japan and willing to work on Brazilian
coffee plantations until they made sufficient money to live comfortably in their
ancestral  home. Thus, from the beginning, these early  migrants had every
intention of returning home.
Recently (since  the later 1980s),  however,  many of the Brazilian Nikkeijin
(usually sons and daughters of Japanese who immigrated to Brazil) have begun
to return to Japan as unskilled ‘foreign workers’. The number of these Nikkeijin
who  are  now living in Japan is approximately 220,000 and that number
continues to grow slightly despite the noticeable  downturn in the Japanese
economy.
15 [Tsuda, 1999: 10] What is interesting about this  case is that the
majority of these Brazilian Nikkeijin expect to work in Japan for only a numberConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
Migrants, Sojourners and Diasporas in a Globalized Era
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of years and then plan to return to Brazil. Despite the fact that they tend to come
from middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds, with very  good  educational
backgrounds, the Nikkeijin settle for unskilled, lower-end jobs while they are in
Japan. They are  usually given the label of dekasegi, i.e. temporary migrant
worker. The primary motivation  for  taking on these jobs is simply to earn
monies that can be remitted to their families’ bank accounts back home in
Brazil.
Between 60% to 80% of the Brazilian Nikkeijin name economic reasons as their
primary motive for leaving Brazil. There is clearly a significant wage differential
between Brazil and Japan. In fact, middle class Brazilian Nikkeijin who migrate
to Japan and are occupied as unskilled ‘dekasegi’ workers in that country can
earn as much as ten times the salary they can make in Brazil. This, more than
anything else, was the main factor for most Nikkeijin who decided to migrate to
Japan. [Ibid: 2-5] The saving which these individuals can make as a result of the
high wages in Japan are then remitted back to family in Brazil and can be as
high as four to five times the average yearly income they would have made if
they had stayed in Brazil. What explains these large  income disparities? One
reason has to do with the fundamental economic imbalances in the international
division of labor. But this is compounded by the unequal distribution of wealth
and productive capacity between developed and developing states. Another
reason has to do with the high value of the Japanese Yen, particularly during the
1980s, which greatly increased the international value of Japanese wages. During
that same period, there was a prolonged economic recession accompanied by
hyperinflation in Brazil that resulted in a decline in real incomes and purchasing
power in that country.
The prolonged economic recession in Brazil posed a major threat to the
relatively high socio-economic status of Nikkeijin living in that country.  This
provided another reason for them to migrate. The Nikkeijin were not willing to
see  their  socio-economic  status in Brazil downgraded. Employment in Japan
provided them with a means of maintaining that status and, in some cases,
improving upon it. Indeed,  “...they  wished to use their sojourn in Japan to
improve or maintain their standard of living in Brazil by purchasing  homes,
cars, and ‘luxury’ items such as video and audio equipment, home appliances,
TVs, and other electronic goods -- things that they had come to expect in their
lives, but which had become  increasingly  unaffordable.”  [Ibid: 4] In other
words, their motivation for leaving Brazil was not because of an absolute level
of economic deprivation but due to “relative deprivation”, which is “based on a
discrepancy between expectations and economic reality.” [Ibid]
Added to the above reasons are  the economic pull  factors  such as the great
demand for migrant workers in Japan. The acute shortage of unskilled labour in
Japan coincided with the economic downturn in Brazil. By the mid to late
1980s, the Japanese birth  rate  had  experienced  continuous  decline and it was
evident that the Japanese population was also aging rapidly. [Cornelius: 1994:
378] These factors, combined with the inability of Japanese companies to draw
on rural labor or Japanese youth to work in low-end jobs,  meant that Japan’s
domestic work force was unable to meet the increasing demand for unskilledW. Andy Knight
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labor during a period of economic boom. Mechanization, automation and other
labour-saving devices (robots, etc.) were  tried, as an attempt to address the
labour shortage, but had more or less reached their limits in Japan. The Japanese
government  therefore needed an influx of unskilled workers to help  ease the
labour shortage as well as to offset the huge welfare  costs that were
accumulating.  Thus, these circumstances provided a “pull” factor for Brazilian
Nekkeijin who took advantage of this window of opportunity to improve their
economic lot. [Table 4]
Thus, it can be argued that Brazilian Nikkeijin who migrate to Japan conduct a
rational cost benefit analysis in making their decision. But those decisions are
aided by definite “push-pull” economic factors as well. Yet, the above micro-
economic and macro-economic analyses cannot provide a full explanation of this
migration flow. Although economic factors may have been the initial impetus
for this particular migration,  other reasons have come into play in this case.
Among them are  historical, ethnic and socio-cultural variables  that act as
transnational connection channels between the sending and receiving  countries.
Examining such variable is important because of the obvious lack of economic
linkage that existed between Brazil and Japan prior to this  wave of Nekkeijin
migration out of Brazil into Japan.
Transnational ethnic ties between Japanese-Brazilians and Japan quite obviously
played a major role in sustaining the migration flow to Japan (what some have
called ‘a return migration’). [Gmelch, 1980:  135-59] Ethnic consciousness is
something that can be perpetuated over generations. Ethnic bonds are
primordial,  recurrent  and largely inexplicable. They can have a certain non-
rational and overpoweringly emotive quality to them. The Japanese  who  left
Japan for Brazil at the turn of the last century have managed to maintain their
kinship  network  in the host country. They not only passed on the myths,
symbols and narratives to their children and grandchildren, they also in most
cases  maintained  contact  with  relatives who remained in Japan. Indeed, the
Brazilian  Nikkeijin  have been able to sustain their Japanese  ethnic traits by
remaining culturally distinct from Brazilians. [Reichl, 1995: 31-62] This very
strong  consciousness of transnational ethnic connections to their ancestral
homeland perhaps best explains why the Brazilian Nikkeijin opted for migration
to Japan as opposed to going to the United States or Europe when similar job
opportunities  were  available in those countries. It also explains why the
Japanese  government, well known for its xenophobia, would revise its
immigration laws and restrictionist policies to accommodate  these  return
migrants.
16  By bringing in individuals of Japanese descent and race to fill a real
need in the work force,  the government of Japan was able to maintain its
cherished goal of keeping Japan as ethnically homogenous as possible.
Clearly, cultural similarities between  the Brazilian Nikkeijin and the local
Japanese made it easier for the  former to be accepted into the Japanese work
force.
17 They were the most acceptable of all foreigners to the Japanese people.
In addition, most of the Nikkeijin had at least some familiarity with the
Japanese  language  (even if they did not speak the language fluently) which
helped to facilitate their acclimatization into the Japanese  society.  Indeed, theConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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initial  wave of Brazilian  Nikkeijin into Japan was made easier as many
Nikkeijin were able to get their Japanese relatives to sponsor them and to assist
them in finding employment.  Thus, one can argue that the awareness of this
strong it was ultimately a strong transnational ethnic affiliation between the
Brazilian  Nikkeijin and local Japanese  contributed to the so-called return
migration (ancestral migration) and may in fact have been just as important as
the economic push-pull factors. [Sellek, 1996: 246-69]
As the economic benefits of this migration become  evident to remaining
Nikkeijin in Brazil, and as the economic crisis in Brazil deepened, the outflow
of Nikkeijin increased exponentially. Instead of viewing the dekasegi experience
negatively, as was done in the early  1980s, the Brazilian Nikkeijin began to
proclaim this type of migration as a particularly good opportunity for younger
Nikkeijin not only to make large sums of money, acquire material goods, and
obtain socio-economic mobility, but also as an opportunity to learn the Japanese
language, experience  true Japanese  culture,  discover  their  ancestral  roots and
acquire useful technical skills whilst they were in Japan.  Indeed  this positive
culture of migration became so entrenched that despite the economic downturn
in Japan in the early 1990s, the immigration of Brazilian Nikkeijin into Japan
continued. This confirms the postulation that the development of a culture of
migration can contribute or significantly expand migrant flow. 
The migration flow is generally facilitated by transnational social networks.
According to  Takeyuki Tsuda these networks link the Nikkeijin with the host
country in a number of ways. The networks in this case  consist of a highly
organized, extensive and efficient transnational labour recruitment and
employment system as well as personal networks of Japanese-Brazilians residing
in both countries. They are a form of support that expedites and simplifies the
migration process. These networks lower the financial and psychological costs
and risks of migration, thus making it easier  for  the Nikkeijin to make the
decision to go to Japan.
18 [Tsuda, 1999] In some cases, the personal networks
has attracted Nikkeijin who go to Japan for reasons other than economic ones
(e.g. reuniting with family members, marriage, etc.)
What we have learned from the above analysis is that the attempt to understand
why international migration occurs requires one to move away  from mono-
causal  explanations. As Takeyuki Tsuda argues, one needs to use a
“comprehensive migration systems approach” in order to properly come to grips
with all of the factors  responsible for migration flows among a group of
countries. This involves using a dynamic and multi-causal perspective  that
examines various transnational economic, sociopolitical, and ethnocultural
linkages  between  the sending and receiving  countries. [Ibid: 1-3 & Fawcett,
1989: 672-80] Indeed, Tsuda makes a powerful argument when he suggests that
there is now a “culture of migration” in the  Japanese-Brazilian  sending
community in Brazil. This culture of migration coupled with the formation of
“transnational migrant networks” between Brazil and Japan constitute part of the
historical, ethnic and sociocultural explanation for the increases in volume of
these particular migrants. So while economic push-pull factors may be central to
this phenomenon, they are not the only ones at play and may not always beW. Andy Knight
20
pivotal (particularly when economic conditions in the host country change as we
have seen in the case of Japan).
What is also clear from the above analysis is that over time migration flows can
result in the formation of a transnational community of a particular  type of
sojourners. In the above case it is the transnational community of ethnic
Brazilian  Nikkeijin. Below I examine  another  transnational  community of
Japanese sojourners (Japanese Peruvians) in order to better understand how this
type of community developed, how its ethnic identity has been transformed as a
consequence of migrations and transnational affiliations, and what impact the
migration process itself has had on this particular group of migrants.
The Peruvian Nikkei Community
Like the Brazilian Nikkeijin, Japanese  Peruvians  have  engaged in what is
referred to above as return migration. Japanese Peruvians are “twice migrants” in
the sense that most of them were  initially  from Okinawa, one of the
southernmost islands of Japan that was a sovereign nation until it was annexed
by the Japanese in 1879. During the turmoil surrounding the demise of the
Tokugawa shogunate and its replacement with the new Meiji government, many
Okinawans migrated to the Kingdom of Hawaii and the United States.  That
initial migration flow was followed by a second emigration by 1899 as the US
placed stricter controls over its immigration policy with respect to the Japanese.
Several of these Okinawan Japanese went to Peru with the temporary intention
of making money before  returning to Japan. However, the majority of them
stayed and Japanese migration to Peru continued at a steady rate  until 1923.
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[Takenaka, 1999: 1460-61]
The return migration of Japanese Peruvians to Japan followed a similar pattern
as that of the Brazilian Nikkeijin. [Table 5] Japan’s revision of its immigration
laws allowed these Peruvian Nikkeijin to enter Japan with relative ease and to
take up employment there. Like the Brazilian Nikkeijin, the Peruvians of
Japanese descent faced a grim economic future if they stayed in Peru. Relocating
to Japan was made easier because of the abundance of unskilled jobs available to
the Nikkeijin, as was noted in the Brazilian case above.  It should be noted that
several Peruvian Nikkeijin (Particularly those of mixed race), after emigrating to
Japan later emigrated to the United States in search of even better opportunities.
Many found that the US was much more open to immigrants than Japan had
been. Others simply wanted to reunite with relatives who had emigrated  from
Okinawa to the US prior to World War II.
20 [Ibid: 1461]
The Japanese-Peruvians community in Peru, while maintaining their ethnicity
and distance from the rest of the Peruvian population, became nevertheless
highly  acculturated. Most of them are  Catholics and Spanish monolinguals.
That community has been greatly affected in several ways by the return
migration.  For instance, during the height of the return migration (i.e. 1990-92)
close to 40% of the Peruvian Nikkeijin left Peru for Japan. Most of them were
third generation Nikkeijin. This mass exodus had a major impact on the mainConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
Migrants, Sojourners and Diasporas in a Globalized Era
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Table 4
Legally Resident Brazilians in Japan, 1975-1995
1975 1985 1990 1995
1,418
0.2%*
1,955
0.2%*
56,429
5.2%*
176,440
13.0%*
* Percentage of total foreign population
Source:  Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare,  Latest Demographic Statistics,
1990-1991. Tokyo:  Institute of Population Problems, 1991.
Table 5
Legally Resident Peruvians in Japan, 1975-1995
1975 1985 1990 1995
--
0.0%*
480
0.1%*
10,279
1.0%*
36,269
2.7%*
* Percentage of total foreign population
Source:  Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare,  Latest Demographic Statistics,
1990-1991. Tokyo:  Institute of Population Problems, 1991.
Japanese-Peruvian school, for example, as enrolment declined by 1,600. Indeed,
the impact was felt throughout the Japanese-Peruvian  community -- e.g. in
small businesses that lost many of their employees and in athletic clubs that
were almost empty. At the same time, however, the return migration also had
some positive effects.  Remittances from those who had emigrated brought
significant revenues into the community, allowing many Nikkeijin to improve
their socio-economic and even political status. We are all well aware of the fact
that a Japanese-Peruvian, Alberta Fujimori, became President of Peru. A slew of
new Japanese-Peruvian small businesses was opened and has flourished.  ThereW. Andy Knight
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was a demand for Japanese language courses and a re-connection by the Peruvian
Nikkeijin with all things Japanese. As Takenaka  put it, even “racially mixed
Japanese Peruvians in Peru’s rural areas who had no prior consciousness of their
Japanese background have suddenly become aware of their heritage and want to
‘maintain’ Japanese customs.” [Ibid: 1464]
All this activity has bolstered the Japanese-Peruvian community in Peru. That
community has been transformed from one that had very little connection to the
ancestral home to one that is now very self-conscious about its “Japanese-ness”.
This has further accentuated the ethnic difference between the Nikkei and the rest
of the Peruvian population. Nikkei values (traditional Japanese values) are now
considered positively by all generations of the Nikkeijin.  Indeed  many of the
traditional values and customs being adhered to by the Japanese Nikkeijin are no
longer practiced by contemporary Japanese youth (e.g. mutual help, discipline,
respect for the elderly, care  for those in the family, honesty, trustworthiness,
hard work, responsibility and punctuality).  Takenaka explores the factors  that
contribute to the consolidation of this ‘transformed’  Japanese-Peruvian
community and which have made the Peruvian Nikkei distinct not only from
non-Japanese Peruvians but also from Japanese living in Japan. [Ibid: 1461-64]
The main point made is that values (rather than blood, per se), culture, tradition
and the “symbolic interpretation” of its distant heritage, are the ingredients that
hold the Japanese-Peruvian community together.
This community is a transnational community that labels itself a “Nikkei”
community – as opposed to a Japanese-Peruvian community or a contemporary
Japanese community. In other words, it is a distinct transnational community
that has redefined  itself  based on something other than strictly “blood-based
ethnicity”.  Indeed, the reference  point  for  this Nikkei community is the
traditional  Japanese  values which are  believed to be inherited from Japanese
ancestry but which no longer exist in Japan. The community is held together
not only by the intersubjective consensus over these values but also by strict
membership selection criteria, norms and codes of behaviour, written and
unwritten rules, and methods of punishment for those who deviate from those
norms, codes and rules. [Ibid: 1466]
This Nikkei community has been constructed in Peru.  However, it has
transcended the state as Japanese-Peruvians become dispersed across the globe.
The transnational Nikkei community is linked by an increasing  number of
transnationally operated Nikkei companies such as remittance firms, by a set of
international Nikkei institutions such as the Pan-American Nikkei Association,
by a number of annual Nikkei conferences,  and by major transborder  Nikkei
sporting events and associations.  “The extended transnational network has
reinforced a Nikkei identity among Japanese Peruvians not only in Peru but also
in  the United States and Japan.” [Ibid: 1470-73] As a result, rather than
becoming part of a melting pot, Japanese  Peruvians  have developed a set of
symbolic values, norms and codes that operate across national borders to ensure
a distinctive Nikkei identity and community. This case study could assist in the
development of a theory of transnational community formation among
international migrants, who are, for all intents and purposes, sojourners.Conceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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Diasporas as International Sojourner Communities
What we have noticed from the two case studies above is that ethnic bonds are
primordial,  recurrent  and sometimes inexplicable. These  bonds  can have an
overpowering  emotive quality tying individuals together in a non-rational
manner. But, in all cases, ethnic bonds are  constructed;  i.e. they stem from
some social or political project, and are  developed over time through
socialization as well as through myths and narratives passed on from generation
to generation. Ethnies  share  symbols and myths of origin, which hold them
together. Some ethnies have a strong attachment to territory, but others have a
strong attachment to an “idea” rather than a piece of land per se. Other ethnies
may be more concerned  with physical detachment from a territory (at least
temporarily) while at the same time having a longing for that place. Diasporas
fall into this category.
As noted above, the concept of diaspora is undergoing some revision during the
contemporary globalized era. Yet, what holds this concept together is the notion
that all diasporas suffer some traumatic event, which leads to dispersal of their
members, who, nevertheless, continue to aspire to return to the homeland.
Therefore while members of a diaspora are international migrants, diaspora as a
concept can be distinguished from that of general international migration.
Diaspora  communities identify strongly with their original or ancestral
homeland. [Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002: 4] What  separates  those in the diaspora
community from other migrant populations and ethnic minorities is that those
in  the diaspora community wish to return  home at some point  when the
situation is better (i.e.  when the homeland is safe  for  their  return)  and the
conditions are right (i.e. when the economic conditions are better, when they can
feel  free to practice  their religion without fear of persecution, or when a
repressive regime is no longer in power). Thus, it is not surprising that most
members of a diaspora generally will have difficulties assimilating into the host
country because they see their current location as little more than a temporary
home. [Marienstras, 1989: 120]
Safran  who lists six basic characteristics of contemporary diasporas confirms
this. These characteristics are: 1) dispersal from an original centre to at least two
peripheral  places; 2) maintenance of a memory, vision, or myth about their
original homeland; 3) belief that they cannot be fully accepted by their  host
country; 4) longing to return to the ancestral home when the time is right; 5)
commitment to the maintenance  and/or restoration of the homeland; 6)
development/construction of a consciousness and solidarity as a group defined
largely around the continued relationship with the homeland. [Safran, 1991: 83-
84] One can argue, based on the above characterization, that diasporas articulate
a cosmopolitanism that is in tension with the nation-state assimilationist
ideology. At the same time, it is also in tension with indigenous and
autochthonous claims.W. Andy Knight
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Toloyan has observed that “diasporas constitute the exemplary communities of
the transnational moment.” [Toloyan, 1991: 5] Indeed, diasporas not only draw
considerable  strength from transnational processes; they also contribute
(sometimes unwittingly) to the intensification of those processes by their own
activity. [Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002] Diaspora in one country may mobilize on
behalf  of national or religious compatriots residing in another country. For
instance, Turkish Sunni-muslims in Germany collected funds to support
muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. Another example of this kind of transnational
diasporic activity can be found in the Ocalan case. After Ocalan’s capture, Kurds
in several countries orchestrated simultaneous protests in a number of different
countries, using fax machines, mobile phone and the mass media to maximum
effect.
Yet, surprisingly, many ethnic diasporic communities are not strong advocates
of transnationalism. Instead, some of them are  more interested in nationalist
projects that would bring space  and identity together in their respective
homelands (states). Some observers have called this “long distance
nationalism”. This diasporic goal of re-territorialization may seem at odds with
the globalization effect of de-territorialization.  However,  the  transnational
character of all diaspora groups is clearly fed by the globalization phenomenon.
Conclusions
The growing interest in international migration is directly linked to the
phenomenon of globalization and its concomitant trend, globalism.
Globalization and globalism have resulted in the shrinking of time and space.
The world is indeed becoming a global village in many respects. However, as
conditions in this globalized era make it easier for people to travel in search of
better jobs, a better life and freedom from fear, certain governments (mostly in
the developed world) are concerned that international migration could upset the
delicate political and socio-economic balance that currently prevails among their
populations. Some other governments (mostly in the developing world) are
concerned  that international migration could further  impoverish them. Yet,
others also in the developing world rely heavily on international migration for
remittances (e.g. the Philippines). Thus, policies are  being  developed to curb
immigration and emigration, in some cases, while at the same time to encourage
certain types of international migration. It would seem that, in light of the fact
that international migration is an under-theorized concept, the time may be ripe
for a deepening of our understanding of what causes international migration and
what are its impacts in a globalized era.
The foregoing analysis is designed to provide fodder for such theorization. As
shown earlier, single causal analysis gives us only a limited understanding of
the nature and impact of international migration.  A multi-variate analysis of
transnational community formation that combines the explanations of rational
choice economics theory at both macro and micro levels, the new economics ofConceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
Migrants, Sojourners and Diasporas in a Globalized Era
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migration theory, dual labour market theory, and network theory with the
characterization of various variants of international migration should bring us
closer to developing a comprehensive and holistic theoretical framework within
which to study this phenomenon.
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End Notes:
1.    Note that according to the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees (UNHCR) there were an estimated 21,793,300 refugees and
displaced persons across the globe. See    http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/text/vtx/home?page=basics  
2.   See    http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/main.htm    
3.  
 Note that a number of international meetings brought attention to the issue,
e.g. the International Conference on Population held in Mexico in 1984.
4.   See the Report of the International Conference on Population and
Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994 (United Nations Publication,
E.95. XIII.18), especially chapter 1, resolution 1, annex.
5.   Globalism and globalization processes result in the shrinkage of social,
political, economic, and cultural distances. As a consequence of these
phenomena, formerly dense and opaque frontiers are being dissolved and
national boundaries are becoming more porous. However, for conceptual
purposes, globalization and globalism can be distinguished. The former
refers to the ongoing economic restructuring at the global level, propelled
by the process of trade liberalization (and a hyper-liberal ideology) and
leading to rapid acceleration of global economic integration. The latter is a
broader term that embraces ‘globalization’ but also indicates a socio-
cultural, political and economic process that could ultimately lead to the
development of a sense of global citizenship among peoples of the globe.
6.   Such conflicts proliferated among ethnic groups in places like Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Bhutan, the Caucasus, the Great Lakes region of Africa, Iraq,
Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, and the
former Yugoslavia.
7.   John Rex, “The Nature of Ethnicity in the Project of Migration,” in
Montserrat Guiberneau & John Rex (eds.), The Ethnicity Reader:
Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, p.269.W. Andy Knight
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8.   This immediate post Cold War period also coincides with what appears to
be a decline in interest in the political ideal of multiculturalism. This is
particularly noticeable in Canada.
9.   Examples of the latter policies would include such measures as employer
sanctions, immigration quotas, etc.
10.  For further elaboration see Douglas Massey et. al., “Migration theory,
ethnic mobilization and globalization,” in Montserrat Guiberneau & John
Rex (eds.), The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and
Migration, pp.259-261.
11.   It is important to note, however, that there are a host of issues around how
“family” is defined in receiving states.
12.  Postmodernist academics are especially guilty of overusing and
misappropriating the term.
13.  One could argue, of course, that once the state of Israel was proclaimed in
1948, in essence the Jewish diaspora (in the classic sense of the term)
disappeared.
14.  Some states turn a blind eye to the problem, when convenient, since
“illegal migrants” may be wanted by exploitative businesses operating in
those states.
15. Note that in 1988 the number of Brazilian nikkeijin was 4,159.
16.  Note that Japan changed its immigration laws in 1990 by revising the
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act that legally admitted the
Nikkeijin without restriction, up to the third-generation Sansei.
17.  One should note that during the mid- to late 1908s, Japan was also faced
with a rash of illegal immigrant from a number of Asian countries whose
cultural and language were quite different from the Japanese. The Japanese
were very uncomfortable with this situation and this made it easier for them
to accept migrant workers who were of the same ethnic background and who
were familiar with the Japanese language.
18.  For a full elaboration of the ways in which these networks operate, see
Takeyuki Tsuda, “The Motivation to Migrate: The Ethnic and Sociocultural
Constitution of the Japanese-Brazilian Return-Migration System,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change vol.48 (1) Oct 1999.
19. That was the year when Japanese migration to Peru by contract was
terminated. See
http://camel2.conncoll.edu/academics/departments/transnat/history/pbhist.ht    
ml    Conceptualizing Transnational Community Formation:
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20.  According to Takenaka, of the 80,000 to 90,000 Japanese-Peruvians today,
one third live in Japan as contract workers and the remainder reside either in
the US or Peru.
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dissolved and national boundaries are becoming more porous.
However, for conceptual purposes, globalization and globalism can
be distinguished. The former refers to the ongoing economic
restructuring at the global level, propelled by the process of trade
liberalization (and a hyper-liberal ideology) and leading to rapid
acceleration of global economic integration. The latter is a broader
term that embraces ‘globalization’ but also indicates a socio-
cultural, political and economic process that could ultimately lead
to the development of a sense of global citizenship among peoples
of the globe.
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